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Abstract: Alabama University has sued artist Daniel Moore for trademark infringement 
over his use of the university's team colours and other indicia in his artwork. The Court of Appeals 
for the 11th Circuit will be releasing a decision soon. This paper asserts that the inclusion of 
sports team trademarks in artwork is a functional use. Therefore, in addition to fair use and 1st 
amendment defences, the functionality doctrine of trademark law protects such artists from being 
held liable for trademark infringement. 
I. Introduction 
 
 “The artist must know the manner whereby to convince others of the truthfulness of his lies.” 
                                                                                     – Pablo Picasso1 
 
Every known human civilization has played sports.2  In the modern era, a massive industry channels sporting 
events, merchandise, and twenty-four hour news coverage to the populace.3  Universities and professional teams 
develop and protect their valuable assets, including the logos and colours that distinguish their team.4  These 
symbols harness the goodwill felt by the customer base towards the team.5  Individuals express support by 
wearing expensive merchandise exhibiting the sports teams’ logos and colours.6  The teams control the 
proliferation of this merchandise primarily through licensing.7  
 
Sports permeate our society to such a degree that an expansive market exists for art portraying important 
sporting events and figures.8   In identifying teams or individuals in their visual works, artists may infringe upon  
                                                          
1
 PEGGY HADDEN, THE QUOTABLE ARTIST 211 (2002).  Please excuse Mr. Picasso’s failure to use a gender-neutral pronoun.   
2
 See Tim Delaney & Tim Madigan, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORTS 1 (prefacing sociology textbook). See also Ancient Roman 
Recreation & Sports, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5tqy0mYTz (describing Ancient Roman sports); Ancient 
Egyptian Sports, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5tqyAtthu (listing Ancient Egyptian sports); The Sport of Life and 
Death: The Mesoamerican Ballgame, available at  http://www.ballgame.org (exhibiting Mesoamerican sports).  America is 
no exception.  See Joshua R. Keefe, Religion, Commodity, or Escape: Sports in Modern American Culture, archived at  
http://www.webcitation.org/5tqxkHM8w (describing prevalence of sport in American culture). See also David Bauder, Super 
Bowl 2010 Ratings: 106 Million Watch, Top-Rated Telecast EVER, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5tqxbawUC 
(noting that 106 million Americans tuned into the 2010 Super Bowl). 
3
 See Plunkett Research, Ltd., Sports Industry Overview, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5tqySMRep (valuing sports 
industry in America at $414 billion US dollars). 
4
 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: Trademark - “A word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or 
seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others.” 
5
 See Mark Sableman, Trademark Laws Underlie Sports Fortunes, 1998 SJR St. Louis Journalism Review (categorizing 
evolution of sports trademark licensing). 
6
 See NFL Shop, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5tqzJ3Qq7 (cataloging available Pittsburgh Steelers uniforms). 
7
 See John Grady & Steve McKelvey, Trademark Protection of School Colors: Smack Apparel and Sinks Decisions Trigger 
Color-ful Legal Debate for the Collegiate Licensing Industry, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 207 (stating that collegiate 
licensing industry tops $3 billion in annual merchandise sales). 
8
 See http://www.fathead.com (providing life size images of athletes); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (2003) 
(finding no infringement or dilution in artist’s painting of Tiger Woods).  
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the sports teams’ trade dress by utilizing their colours and logos.9  Thus, a conflict can arise between the right of 
these artists to convey their message and the interest of companies in protecting their trademark assets.10  Artists 
typically assert affirmative defences if sued by trademark owners to avoid infringement (and the licensing fees 
that follow).11  However, a trademark determined to be functional receives no protection.12  Trademark law’s 
functionality doctrine can obviate the need for an artist to plead an affirmative defence while making 
determinations of infringement more predictable.13 
 
This note proposes applying the aesthetic functionality doctrine to prevent sports teams from asserting 
trademark rights over their team colours used in artwork.  Section II (History) commences by summarizing 
contemporary US trademark law and depicting the movement in courts towards protecting colour as a trademark.  
Section II (History) also describes the functionality doctrine, outlines the merchandising right, and briefly 
examines alternative defences to infringement.  Section III (Facts and Premises) describes recent developments 
in sports merchandising cases in which universities and sports teams attempted to enforce their trademark rights 
against infringers.  Section IV (Analysis) concludes this note by examining the benefits of applying the 
functionality doctrine to artistic uses of sports team’s colours. 
2. History 
2.1 Trademarks Generally 
A trademark “identif[ies] the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed.”14  Trademark infringement 
developed as a state common-law action.15  The Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”) codified common law 
trademark principles into federal law for marks used in interstate commerce; Congress amended the Lanham Act 
several times.16  Under the Lanham Act, a trademark “includes any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used . . . 
to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . and to indicate the source of the goods.”17  The Lanham Act  
 
 
                                                          
9
 See University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238 (2009) (suing artist over inclusion of 
Alabama football team colors in realistic paintings).  See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: Trade Dress – “The overall 
appearance and image in the marketplace of a product or a commercial enterprise.  For a product, trade dress typically 
comprising packaging and labeling.  For an enterprise, it typically comprises design and color.” 
10
 See id.  In other words, a multi-million dollar market exists: the sports teams want to maximize their earnings and the 
artists want to be able to make a living. 
11
 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (codifying common law fair use defense). 
12
 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §5:10 (4th ed. 2010) (describing 1998 Amendment to 
Lanham Act making functionality an explicit ground for ex parte rejection).   
13
 See Brief for et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Alabama v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 
1238 (2009) (Nos. 09-16412-AA, 10-10092-A) (commenting on behalf of New Life, Inc.). 
14
 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (defining proper function of trademark). 
15
 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §4:4 (4th ed. 2010) (defining technical trademark under 
state common law).  Marks have been used for centuries to indicate the source of goods.  See Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT, 
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED (rev. 5th ed. 2004) (introducing trademark law).  Actions for infringement were originally 
limited to competing goods.  See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F.510 (7th Cir. 1912) (holding 
that Borden Ice Cream does not infringe on Borden’s Condensed milk).  In the 20th century, this expanded to include any use 
likely to cause confusion.  See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (defining the conditions for a civil infringement action).  
Geographical use restrictions apply. See Dawn Donut Co., Inc v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(finding no confusion where junior mark-user resides in a geographically separate market). 
16
 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051-1141 (administering federal statutory trademark law).  The constitutional vehicle by 
which the Lanham Act was created is the Commerce Clause.  Contrast this with federal protections of Patents and 
Copyrights, which are constitutional under Article I, Section I, Clause 8 of the Constitution.  See also 1 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §5:5 (4th ed. 2010) (listing amendments to the Lanham Act). 
17
 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining the term trademark). 
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provides a cause of action for infringement.18   Interpreting the Lanham Act, courts have determined that in order 
to qualify for protection a trademark must be both non-functional and distinctive.19   
 
The Supreme Court defined functionality as “essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the 
cost or value of the article.”20  Distinctive marks can 1) be inherently distinctive or 2) have acquired 
distinctiveness.21  Generic terms are never protectable as trademarks because they describe the product or service 
and cannot designate source.22  A trademark qualifies as inherently distinctive if it is suggestive, fanciful, or 
arbitrary because it intrinsically identifies a particular product’s source.23  However, a merely descriptive 
trademark can attain distinctiveness by acquiring secondary meaning.24  Secondary meaning exists when the 
public perceives the mark as depicting the source of the goods, rather than the product itself.25  The concept of 
secondary meaning recognizes that words may attain source designating function in the minds of the public 
where those words are otherwise descriptive.26  
 
Several policy justifications stimulate our protection of trademarks.27  Protection allows trademarks to 
efficiently designate source; consumers purchasing a product can trust that the product will possess the qualities 
that they are accustomed to receiving from a particular source.28  This trust lowers search costs creating a more 
competitive marketplace, i.e., a secondary aim of trademark is to allow competitive forces in the marketplace to 
function most efficiently.29  Protecting trademarks also guards the “owner's investment in the quality of the mark 
and the quality of the goods or services the mark identifies.”30   
 
                                                          
18
 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (defining the conditions for a civil infringement action).  “Any person who . . . uses 
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . which is likely to cause confusion . . . shall be liable in a civil 
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”  Id.  
19
 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of 
being protected if it either 1) is inherently distinctive or 2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.  It is also 
clear that eligibility for protection under §43(a) depends on non-functionality”). 
20
 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (1982) (finding no infringement in mislabeling of 
generic drugs). There continues to be debate about the definition of functionality.  See Mitchell M. Wong, The Aesthetic 
Functionality Doctrine and the Law of Trade Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1119-21 (1998) [hereinafter 
Wong] (summarizing tests for trademark functionality and championing traditional identification test). 
21
 See 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §11:2 (4th ed. 2010) (illustrating two basic categories in 
which trademarks must be placed). 
22
 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (describing generic term as referring to 
the genus that the product is a species of); See also Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 
1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing generic term as one that answers the question of “what are you?”).  Even registered terms 
that become generic can be cancelled. Haughton Elevator Company 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Commr. Pat 1950) (cancelling 
registration of the term escalator); Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc. 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding 
no protectable trademark in the generic term “Murphy bed”).   
23
 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 13 (1995) (“designation is ‘inherently distinctive’, in that …. prospective 
purchasers are likely to perceive it is a designation that, in the case of a trademark, identifies goods or services produced or 
sponsored by a particular person, whether known or anonymous”). 
24
 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 635 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that Abercrombie had not 
established secondary meaning in their store trade dress). 
25
 See 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §11:2 (4th ed. 2010) (defining secondary meaning). 
26
 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: Secondary Meaning – “A special sense that a trademark or tradename for a business, 
goods, or services has acquired even though the trademark or tradename was originally merely descriptive and therefore not 
protectable.  The term does not refer to a subordinate or rare meaning, but rather to a later meaning that has been added to the 
original one borne by the mark or name and that has now become in the market its usual and primary meaning.” 
27
 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 15-17 (describing twin purposes of 
trademark law). 
28
 See Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc. 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Easily identified trademarks reduce the 
costs consumers incur in searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the market”).   
29
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-164 (1995) (discussing an economic efficiency justification 
for trademark law). 
30
 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §2:4 (4th ed. 2010) (listing policy rationales of trademark 
protection).  Protecting the owner’s investment in turn leads to an increase in the quality of the goods created. Id. 
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In trademark case law, judges make a distinction between the terms “trade dress” (product packaging) and 
“trademark” (words or pictures); however, little remaining legal significance remains between the terms.31  
Courts have interpreted colour as being a “word, name, symbol or device” capable of identifying the source of 
goods.32  For instance, a press-pad manufacturer can protect as a trademark the gold/yellow colon of its press-
pads.33  Product design (e.g., the form or colour of an article of clothing) can be protected only upon a showing 
of secondary meaning.34  Product packaging, such as the interior décor of a restaurant, can be inherently 
distinctive.35  Colour is always a product design feature, not packaging, and thus always requires secondary 
meaning.36 
2.2 Functionality Doctrine 
When product designs receive trademark protection, functional design features can potentially be monopolized.37  
The functionality doctrine seeks to prevent such a monopoly from occurring.38   The Lanham Act does not 
provide an explicit definition for functionality and courts have been left to formulate tests guiding its 
application.39  Thus, a substantial degree of uncertainty still lingers in courts’ interpretation of the doctrine.40  
The Supreme Court provided some guidance: “the functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to 
promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by 
allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.”41  Courts avoid inhibiting legitimate competition by 
applying the functionality doctrine to utilitarian features and aesthetic features.42 
 
Utilitarian functionality exists where a product feature is “essential to the use or purpose of the article.”43  
However, simply because a feature provides some utilitarian function does not guarantee that trademark 
protection will be denied.44  Instead, the relevant inquiry is “not to the mere existence of utility, but to the degree 
of design utility.”45  For example, the Court in Morton-Norwich found that the design of a spray bottle’s handle  
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983) (‘The trade dress of a product is 
essentially its total image and overall appearance”). See also Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 
1986) (finding “no substantive difference” between trademarks and trade dress). 
32
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, at 172 (1995) (interpreting the Lanham Act definition of 
trademark as including color); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining the term trademark). 
33
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that Qualitex’s use of color as a trademark met 
basic legal requirements).   
34
 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (finding design of Samara’s children’s’ clothing not 
protectable absent a showing of secondary meaning). 
35
 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (deciding that interior décor of Mexican Restaurant provides 
designation of source);  
36
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (noting the difference between color on a product 
and product packaging). 
37
 See Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (preventing Kellog from monopolizing the pillow shape of 
shredded wheat).  Such a monopoly would violate no less a source than the US Constitution by running afoul of the limited 
times provision of the Copyright Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).   
38
 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: Functionality - “The quality of having a shape, configuration, design, or color that is so 
superior to available alternatives that giving the first user exclusive trademark rights would hinder competition.” 
39
 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 148 (discussing evolution of the 
functionality doctrine). 
40
 See Wong, supra note 20, at 1119 (pointing to failed understanding of functionality as the cause of the uncertainty). 
41
 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (defining functionality doctrine). 
42
 See, e.g., id. 
43
 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (Cust. Ct. 1982) (proposing test for utilitarian 
functionality). 
44
 See In Re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc, 671 F.2d 1332, 1338 (1982) (defining the term ‘utilitarian’). 
45
 See id.  
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was not functional, in part because of the availability of numerous alternative designs.46  In TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the Supreme Court decided that a recognizable dual spring design on a road sign 
was functional and thus not protected.47  The Court found the existence of a utility patent in the spring design to 
be of vital significance.48  These cases highlight two of the common approaches used to determine functionality. 
49
 
 
The “identification” test, employed by the Court in Morton-Norwich, states that “A feature or design is 
functional . . . if it performs some function other than identifying the source of goods.”50  The “effective 
competition” test, used by the Traffix Court, asks “if conferring trademark protection for that feature would 
enable the trademark holder to prevent other suppliers from competing over the market for the product.”51  
Under either test, some courts assert that functionality exists where the product feature in question “affects the 
cost or quality of the article.”52   
 
Courts also apply the functionality doctrine to aesthetic design aspects.53  The aesthetic functionality doctrine 
protects competitors from suffering a non-reputation related disadvantage as a result of the application of 
trademark law to an aesthetic consideration.54  For instance, a court found the black colour of a company’s 
outboard motors to be functional because the colour black provides a slimming effect and blends in with the 
water.55  Such a colour preference is not always a determining factor; a court denied applying the doctrine to a 
consumer preference for red vacuum cleaners.56  Unlike the black motors in Brunswick, the public covets red 
vacuum cleaners for innocuous reasons; the red colour does not provide any additional function and thus 
competing manufacturers do not suffer a non-reputation related disadvantage if the colour is monopolized.57  The 
primary inquiry to be made is whether the aesthetic feature indentifies source without hi-jacking a consumer- 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 See id. at 1342-43 (“If the functions of appellant's bottle can be performed equally well by containers of innumerable 
designs . . . why did the board state that appellant's design is functional and for that reason not registrable?”). 
47
 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (refusing to afford protection to the dual-spring 
design used to keep road signs upright). 
48
 See id. (finding existence of a prior utility patent to be strong evidence of functionality). 
49
 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d 619, 641 (6th Cir. 2002) (identifying two 
forms of functionality). 
50
 Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (Ark. 1994).  See also Wong, supra note 20, 1132 (defining 
identification theory as the original understanding of functionality); Restatement (First) of Torts § 742 (1938) (“feature of 
goods is functional . . . if it affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling or 
using them; it is non-functional if it does not have any of such effects.”). 
51
 Wong, supra note 20, at 1143 (describing effective competition test as the presently prevailing test in courts). 
52
 See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (1982) (finding manufacturers of a generic drug 
not to be liable for mislabeling by pharmacists). 
53
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1995).  See also See Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites 
Distribution, LLC., 369 F.3d 1197, 1203 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting existence of two tests for functionality).  “Using the theory 
of “aesthetic functionality,” a few courts have expanded the meaning of “functional” to include merely ornamental features 
which “function to improve the appearance of goods and help sell them.” 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §7:49 (4th ed. 2010). 
54
 See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, 560 F.Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (finding tractor accessories to be functional because of the 
market preference for color matched accessories).  Such a non-reputation related disadvantage can arise because of 
competitive need. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys. Inc. v. Duracraft Corp, 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995) (defining 
functionality in terms of competitive need). 
55
 See Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (C.A. Fed. 1994) (finding the slimming effect of black motors 
to be functional); See also HI Ltd. Partnership v. Winghouse of Florida, Inc. 347 F.Supp.2d 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (finding 
Hooters girl outfit to be functional). 
56
 See White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co.,  2000 WL 713972 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (determining that 
red color of hand held vacuums is not de jure functional); See also Automotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc, 457 
F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding VW logo on a keychain to be non-functional). 
57
 See White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 2000 WL 713972 (T.T.A.B. 2000) at 5 (evidencing 
lack of consumer need of consumers to own vacuums of a particular color). 
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desired product feature.58  Courts will not protect ornamental aspects of a product that commandeer a useful 
feature by dint of the aesthetic functionality doctrine.59 
2.3 Licensing of Sports Merchandise 
Sports entities control the spread of merchandise bearing their marks through licensing.60  Typically, these 
entities deal with an exclusive licensing partner.61  If an individual sells team merchandise without permission, 
the team most likely demands a royalty; an action for infringement can follow.62  The Lanham Act imposes 
confusion as to the source of the goods as the threshold requirement to prove infringement.63  In the case of team 
logos and colours, it is not immediately apparent that the mark designates the source of the good – it could show 
affiliation or support for the franchise.64  However, a series of court decisions in the mid 1970’s opened the door 
to sports franchises requiring payment for the usage of their marks.65   
 
The National Hockey League’s (“NHL”) member teams possessed identifying team trademarks and granted 
permission to particular manufacturers to use these trademarks on NHL merchandise.66  Without the permission 
of the NHL’s licensing agent, a manufacturer began embedding the NHL’s logos on “embroidered cloth 
emblems” (clothing and hats).67  The NHL sued claiming trademark infringement; the district court found no 
infringement because of lacking confusion as to source.68  The district court noted no right to relief exists for 
designs used in a non-trademark fashion.69   The district court stated, “In the instant case, the registered 
trademark is, in effect, the product itself.  The marks have achieved intrinsic value to a segment of the 
consuming public which may be attracted to their aesthetic features and to their characteristics as a patch to be 
used on apparel or for collecting.”70  According to the district court, the trademark had merged with the product 
and no longer performed a source designating function.71   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58
 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §7:49 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the use of color in trade 
dress). 
59
 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §7:49 (4th ed. 2010) (noting the extension of the 
functionality doctrine to functional aesthetic features in some courts). 
60
 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fair Acommpli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 
461 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right] (describing rampant sports licensing). 
61
 See Reebok Signs Exclusive Licensing Deal with NFL, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5uOQEh72F (describing 
Reebok as the official licensing partner of the NFL); Reebok Partnerships, archived at 
http://www.webcitation.org/5uOQHOy5P (“Reebok has the exclusive worldwide rights to manufacture and market authentic, 
replica and practice jerseys using the names and logos of the NHL and its teams”);  About CLC, archived at 
http://www.webcitation.org/5uOQNl18u (describing the collegiate licensing company, the exclusive licensing agent of 
numerous universities). 
62
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 461-62 (noting tendency of universities to garner 
royalties). 
63
 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (defining infringement). 
64
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 464 (questioning existence of point-of-source confusion 
in sports merchandising litigation). 
65
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 461 (criticizing the merchandising right). 
66See Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 459, 462-63 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (finding 
trademark infringement in manufacturers production of merchandise bearing NHL franchise trademarks). 
67
 Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 459, 462-63 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (listing facts 
of the case). 
68
 Id  at 462 (finding in favor of the defendants at the district court). 
69
 See Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 459, 463 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (requiring a 
trademark use in order to fall within the ambit of Lanham Act protection). 
70
 Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 459, 464 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 
71
 See id. 
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The Fifth Circuit overturned the district court’s application of the functionality doctrine to the NHL team 
colours.72   The court felt that the mere identification by consumers of the teams’ trademarks fulfilled the 
confusion requirement of the Lanham Act.73  The Fifth Circuit mentioned functionality only briefly and stated 
“the embroidered symbols are sold not because of any such aesthetic characteristic but because they are the 
trademarks of the hockey teams.” 74  While focusing on the propensity of the marks to drive sales, the court 
ignored the lack of source confusion.75   
 
In a similar factual situation, The NFL sued manufacturers producing goods bearing the NFL’s registered 
trademarks.76   The court enjoined the production of these goods.77  The court’s reasoning differed slightly from 
the logic used in Boston Hockey; instead, the court viewed the confusion present as sponsorship confusion.78  
Sponsorship confusion exists when “consumers are likely to think the proprietor has licensed or otherwise 
endorsed the goods or services of the offending party.”79  The NFL presented evidence that purchasers of NFL 
jerseys believe the jerseys to be officially licensed by the NFL.80  National Football League Properties and 
Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n supported the emergence of the merchandising right.81 
 
In these cases, the courts found infringement despite the absence of a likelihood of confusion as to the source 
of the goods.82  Instead, the courts justified their decisions as “an instinctive reaction against ‘unjust 
enrichment’.”83  Courts often react instinctively against free-riding, despite its prevalence in our market 
economy.84  Free-riding, however, is generally encouraged in United States because it creates competition, 
driving down prices and improving the quality of goods.85  The decisions depart from traditional justifications 
for trademark protection and have received criticism from courts and commentators.86  However, the decisions 
emboldened the sports entities and they quickly asserted their newfound rights.87  The decisions led to an 
explosion in the amount of revenues garnered by the sports merchandising industry.88 
                                                          
72
 See Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1014 (5th Cir. 1975) (reversing the 
district court’s verdict). 
73
  See id. at 1012 (“The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the protected 
trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify them as being the teams' trademarks.”) 
74
 Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1013 (5th Cir. 1975). 
75
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 474 (“The Fifth Circuit's reversal broke new theoretical 
ground and effectively wrote the confusion requirement out of the Lanham Act”). 
76
 See National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 247, 248-49 (Ill. App. 1975) 
(biographizing the parties involved in litigation and summarizing facts).  
77
 See id. at 251. 
78
 See id. at 249. 
79
 Roger E. Schechter & John R. Thomas, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 
638-39 (2003) (defining sponsorship confusion); See also 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §24:6 
(4th ed. 2010). 
80
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 477 (“later rulings in NFL suits have turned upon 
surveys and other evidence indicating the widespread belief that team-related jerseys are officially licensed by the NFL”). 
81
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 477-78 (detailing historical emergence of the 
merchandising right). 
82
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 474 (noting that the NHL decision found actionable 
confusion based solely upon consumers’ mental association). 
83
 See id. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY - Unjust Enrichment “The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without 
offering compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected.” 
84
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 479.  “In a market economy it is not reasonable to 
simply assume that someone must own the right to compete in a particular way.”  Id. at 480. 
85
 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1050 (“society in general 
doesn't prohibit free riding”). 
86
 See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing the decision as “an 
extraordinary extension of the protection heretofore afforded trademark owners”); Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising 
Right, supra note 60 at 461 (criticizing this expansion of trademark law at length). 
87
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 462-63 (2005) (characterizing mark-holders as 
“emboldened” by merchandising right decisions).   
88
 See id at 461. 
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Courts continue to debate the scope of the merchandising right.89  For instance, Louisiana State University 
and several other schools brought suit for infringement against Smack Apparel, a clothing manufacturer that 
utilized team colours and slogans associated with the university on t-shirts.90  Relying on Boston Hockey, the 
court found the universities’ team colours to be non-functional protectable trademarks.91  The court noted the 
competitive necessity issue present in an aesthetic functionality analysis and admitted that the Supreme Court 
had provided guidance on this doctrine (in Qualitex), but refused to recognize aesthetic functionality in their 
jurisdiction.92  In language indicative of fear of free-riding, the court stated, “Smack's alleged competitive 
disadvantage in the ability to sell game day apparel relates solely to an inability to take advantage of the 
Universities' reputation [emphasis added] and the public's desired association with the Universities that its shirts 
create.”93  Smack Apparel indicates the expanded focus of modern courts towards unjust enrichment, a focus that 
extends beyond the traditional cynosure of source confusion.94 
 
Other courts have taken a less expansive outlook towards the merchandising right.95  The University of 
Kansas brought suit against Larry Sinks for selling unlicensed clothing bearing the Kansas colours at a Joe-
College.com website.96  The court described functionality using language akin to the identification test stating 
that “there is no evidence that KU's marks are essential to the quality of T-shirts, or affect how the T-shirts 
‘work’.”97  However, the court did not find the marks to be functional.98  Instead, the court based its decision in 
favour of the defendant on insufficient evidence indicating sponsorship confusion.99  The court examined the 
shirts in total: the inclusion of the Kansas colours was just one component.100  University of Kansas v. Sinks 
provides an example of a court hesitant to embrace the expansion of the merchandising right.101 
 
So while uncertainty lingers in the case law as to the breadth of the merchandising right, universities 
continue to seek licensing fees for the use of their team colours and logos.102  Over the years, the right has  
 
 
                                                          
89
 See Texas Tech University v. Red Raider Outfitter, 461 F.Supp.2d 510 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (finding infringement in retailers’ 
continual sale of unlicensed Texas Tech merchandise); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. 604 F.2d 200 
(2d. Cir. 1979) (holding that use of Dallas Cowboy cheerleader indicia in a movie established a likelihood of confusion); 
University of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (enjoining beer manufacturer from using on its label 
Georgia’s bulldog trademark); In re San Diego National League Baseball, Inc. 224 U.S.P.Q. 1067 (1983) (refusing to register 
the marks “Padres Report” and “San Diego Padres Report”). 
90
 See Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d 
465, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing parties in the litigation and procedural history). 
91
 See id. at 486 (“the presence of the plaintiffs' marks serve no function unrelated to trademark.”) 
92
 See id at 487-88  
93
 Id at 488. 
94
 See Mark Lemley, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137 (2010) [hereinafter Owning Mark(et)s] (“The culprit again is 
the anti-free-riding impulse”); Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 
1839, 1911-12 (2007) (summarizing courts’ approach to analyzing merchandising right cases). 
95
 See, e.g., U.S. v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (criticizing Boston Hockey decision as being overly broad 
conception of trademark rights). 
96
 See University of Kansas v. Sinks, 565 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1225-26 (D. Kan. 2008) (describing parties in the litigation and 
procedural history).. 
97
 Id. at 1261. 
98
 See id. 
99
 See id. at 1267 (“a reasonable jury could find that the language on the back of the T-shirts is the dominant portion of 
defendants' marks and serves to distinguish them from officially licensed KU products and from any sponsorship or 
affiliation with KU”).  The court defines sponsorship confusion as “when use of a trademark leads individuals (other than the 
purchaser) mistakenly to believe that a product was manufactured by the trademark-holder.”  Id. 
100
 See id. at 1245. 
101
 See, e.g., International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg, 633 F.2d 912 (Cal. 1980) (chastising the Boston Hockey 
decision as transmogrifying the narrow protections of trademark into a broad monopoly). 
102
 See James Wagner, Copycat Logos Are Pitting High Schools and Colleges in a Trademark Turf War, WASHINGTON POST, 
Oct. 21, 2010, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5wTYEeK6i (portraying trademark disputes between high schools and 
colleges over similar team logos) 
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    
Vol. 7, Issue 1 (2012) 
35 
 
 
 
 
become further entrenched; teams and universities consider the merchandising right uncontestable.103  Mark-
holding business entities attempt to maximize trademark revenue and demand payment from artists where the 
right is implicated.104 
2.4  Alternative Defenses: Fair Use and the First Amendment 
Artists assert affirmative defences to avoid liability.105  The fair use defence includes classic fair use and 
nominative fair use.106  Defendants claim classic (or descriptive) fair use where they “ha[ve] used the term fairly 
and in good faith solely to describe the actor’s goods, services, or business or to indicate a connection with the 
named person.”107  Nominative fair use “is a use of another's trademark to identify, not the defendant's goods or 
services, but the plaintiff's goods or services.”108  The distinction between the two fair use defences lies in whose 
product (plaintiff or defendant) the trademark is describing.109 
 
A defendant establishes a classic fair use defence by proving that their use was 1) other than as a mark, 2) in 
a descriptive sense, and 3) in good faith.110  Analyzing the good faith prong involves asking “whether the alleged 
infringer intended to trade on the good will of the trademark owner by creating confusion as to the source of the 
goods or services.”111  Classic fair use can be claimed even for uses likely to confuse consumers, though 
confusion remains an important consideration in evaluating fair use.112  The KP Permanent court provided 
several factors for the jury to consider in determining whether a fair use defence is applicable: “the degree of 
likely confusion, the strength of the trademark, the descriptive nature of the term . . ., the extent of the use of the 
term prior to the registration of the trademark, and any differences among the times and contexts in which KP 
has used the term.”113  Substantial interplay occurs in a proceeding between the likelihood of confusion analysis 
and the fair use defence.114 
                                                          
103
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 462-63 (2005) (characterizing mark-holders as 
“emboldened” by merchandising right decisions).   
104
 See Fox News Network v. Penguin Group, 31 Media L. Rep. 2254 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003) (refusing to enjoy Al 
Franken’s use of Fox trademark “fair and balanced” in his book title). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act 
and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999) (“Courts protect trademark owners against uses that 
would not have been infringements even a few years ago and protect as trademarks things that would not have received such 
protection in the past”). 
105
 See e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004) (finding defendant’s use of the 
term “micro colors” to be a fair use). 
106
 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 663 (summarizing fair use of 
another’s trademark). 
107
 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 28 (1995).  See also Lanham Act §33(b)(4)  
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the 
party’s individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a 
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of 
such party, or their geographic origin. 
108
 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §11:45 (4th ed. 2010) (elaborating on the two types of fair use 
defenses).   
109
 See Cains v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between the two fair use defenses).  
The nominative fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark to describe the 
plaintiff’s product, even if the defendant’s ultimate goal is to describe his own product.  Conversely, the classic fair 
use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark only to describe his own product, and 
not at all to describe the plaintiff’s product. 
Id.  
110
 See International Stamp Art, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding Postal 
Service’s use of a perforated border on stamp art to be a good faith fair use). 
111
 Id. 
112
 See e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004) (analyzing legislative intent 
behind the Lanham Act to conclude that there is no burden on the defendant to negate confusion when claiming fair use). 
113
 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005) 
114
 See e.g. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (allowing defendant to plead fair use 
defense without having to negate confusion). 
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Nominative fair use provides a separate flavour of fair use and the defence is typically equated with 
permissible comparative advertising.115  Nominative fair use exists when the defendant can prove: 1) that the 
product or service in question was one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; 2) that only so much 
of the mark or marks was used as was reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and 3) that the 
user did nothing that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.116  As in descriptive 
fair use, courts adopt a bifurcated approach testing “confusion and fairness in separate inquiries.”117  
 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals’ freedom of religion, speech, and 
press.118 The Supreme Court noted that when the freedom of expression conflicts with the appearance of a 
trademark in a creative work, the court should construe the Lanham Act “to apply to artistic works only where 
the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.”119  Artwork 
portraying sporting events receives the same First Amendment protection as other fine art.120  The higher the 
level of First Amendment rights implicated, the more likely the fair use assertion succeeds.121 
3.  Facts/Premise 
Alabama University (“University”) is the oldest public university in the state of Alabama.122  The University’s 
athletic teams are nicknamed the Crimson Tide and wear the colours of crimson and white for identification.123  
The football team is renowned and prestigious, having won twelve college national championships since its 
inception in 1892.124  The University ranked eighth among college universities in 2009 generating $57.37 million 
in revenues from college football.125 
 
Daniel Moore (“Moore”) is a citizen of Alabama.126  Moore is an “exceptional and beloved sports artist.”127  
He has rendered numerous realistic renditions of famous sports moments and figures in his “creative and  
                                                          
115
 See R.G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (allowing comparison of “Second Chance” perfume to 
“Chanel No. 5” as nominative fair use). 
116
 See New Kids on the Block v. New Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding newspapers’ use of the 
trademark ‘New Kids on the Block’ to be covered by nominative fair use). 
117
 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d. Cir. 2005) (requiring Century 21 to prove 
confusion in LendingTree’s use of their mark before turning to nominative fair use determination).  
118
 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”). 
119
 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the movie title “Ginger and Fred” did not infringe on 
Ginger Rodger’s right of publicity). 
120
 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003). “A piece of art that portrays a historic 
sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture attaches to such events.  It would be ironic indeed if the 
presence of the images of the victorious athlete would deny the work of First Amendment protection.”  Id. 
121
 See ESS Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).  
An artistic work's use of a trademark that otherwise would violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless the (use 
of the mark) has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless 
(it) explicitly misleads as to the source of the content of the work. 
Id. 
122
 See Univ. Compl. at 7, University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238 (N.D.Ala., 2009) 
(2005 WL 986824) [hereafter Univ. Compl.] (stating that Alabama University was founded in 1831). 
123
 See id. at 14-16 (mentioning federal registration of trademarks Crimson Tide and Roll Tide).  Additionally, the team 
utilizes an elephant mark, a BAMA mark, and the color scheme.  Id. 
124
 See id. at 8 (noting athletic excellence).  Bear Bryant is the most famous individual associated with the Alabama football 
program.  See id.  He coached the program from 1958 to 1982. See id. 
125
 See Report: Auburn, Alabama make top 10 in football revenue, total sports income, archived at 
http://www.webcitation.org/5uRNcyDWZ (reporting 2007-2008 earnings for Alabama and Auburn).  The university 
generated $88.87 million in overall sports revenue.  Id.  
126
 See Univ. Compl., supra note 122 at 6 (introducing the parties in the litigation). 
127
 Brief of Appellee at 16, University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238 (N.D.Ala.,2009) 
(2010 WL 3842708) [hereafter “Brief of Appellee”] (introducing Moore).  Moore was named the “2005 Sports Artist of the 
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hallmarked style.”128   His paintings command prices as high as $75,000.129  Moore incorporated New Life Inc. 
(“New Life”) to promote and sell his artistic works.130   The majority of his paintings portray important moments 
in Alabama football history.131  The works include football players wearing the trademarked university colours 
of crimson and white.132 
 
Moore’s relationship with the university commenced in 1981, when he was licensed to create a print of 
famous Alabama football coach Bear Bryant.133  For many years the University promoted and sold Moore’s 
works.134  Moore paid a licensing fee for works that included indicia on the borders.135  Their relationship began 
to disintegrate in 2002 when the University began to demand licenses from Moore for all works depicting 
Alabama sporting events.136  Moore found these demands to be unacceptable as they would “control what he 
painted and how he expressed his messages.”137  The relationship further deteriorated and the University brought 
suit in Alabama district court.138 
 
In their claim, the University pleaded multiple claims for relief: breach of contract, federal unfair 
competition, state trademark dilution, common law trademark infringement, and unjust enrichment.139  Upon the 
University’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court concluded that the University’s colours and 
uniform trade dress were functional and that there was no likelihood of confusion as to source.140  Distinguishing 
Moore’s facts from Boston Hockey, the court stressed the “total distinction” between the use of colours in a piece 
of fine art as opposed to “cards, T-shirts, cups, mugs, posters, mini prints, and calendars.”141  Thus, Moore’s 
paintings did not infringe on the University’s trademarks.142   
 
The University appealed these findings.143  In their appeal, the University highlights the non-functionality 
and uncontested secondary meaning of their marks.144  The University contends that aesthetic functionality is a 
“dying doctrine” and that applying “aesthetic” principles to functionality is a slippery slope.145  The appeal 
evokes Smack while arguing that the colour schemes used by Moore “had no significance other than to identify 
with the Universities and were therefore non-functional.”146  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Year” by the United States Sports Academy.  See Brief of Appellee at 15, University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life 
Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238 (N.D.Ala.,2009) (2008 WL 3115445).   
128
 Brief of Appellee, supra note 127 at 17 (describing Moore’s professional reputation). 
129
 See Daniel A. Moore Prints, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5uRNyAxGA (displaying Moore’s biography). 
130
 See University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1244 (N.D.Ala.,2009). 
131
 See Daniel A. Moore Prints, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5uRNyAxGA.   Moore does seem to depict other 
universities’ important football moments, as well as some other sports.  Id.  
132
 See Daniel A. Moore Prints, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5uRNyAxGA.    
133
 See Univ. Compl., supra note 122 at 18. 
134
 See Univ. Compl., supra note 122 at 19. 
135
 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 127 at 22.  Moore paid the licensing fee because he felt the indicia banner increased the 
marketability of his prints. 
136
 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 127 at 29.  See also And the Tide Rolls On . . . To Court, available at  
www.webcitation.org/5uROEkIzJ (summarizing litigation between New Life and Alabama University). 
137
 Brief of Appellee, supra note 127 at 30. 
138
 See Univ. Compl., supra note 122. 
139
 See Univ. Compl., supra note 122 at 23-60 (listing causes of action). 
140
 See Univ. Brief. at 21-29, University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp.  2d 1238 (N.D.Ala., 
2009) (2010 WL 3842707) [hereafter Univ. Brief]. 
141
 University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp.  2d 1238, 1250 (N.D.Ala., 2009). 
142
 See Univ. Brief, supra note 140 at 21-29. 
143
 See Univ. Brief, supra note 140 at 21-29. 
144
 See Brief of Appellee at 12, University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238 
(N.D.Ala.,2009) (2010 WL 3842709). 
145
 Id. at 12. 
146
 Id. at 13. 
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    
Vol. 7, Issue 1 (2012) 
38 
 
 
 
 
As Appellee, New Life argues that the functionality doctrine bars trademark protection of the team colours in 
Moore’s paintings.147  From the perspective of utilitarian functionality, New Life takes the position that the 
functionality doctrine applies because Moore’s intention is to paint interesting football plays and “[p]ainting 
interesting plays in an Alabama football game necessitates depiction of Alabama football uniforms, which serve  
the non-source related function of making the painting realistic.”148  In terms of aesthetic functionality, the 
“inability to use Alabama’s uniform colours would put New Life at a similarly significant, non-reputation-related 
disadvantage” in his capacity as a sports artist.149  New Life further asserts that the University seeks a monopoly 
over accurate depiction.150  The amicus brief characterizes the University’s justifications as mere dislike of 
unjust enrichment and a desire to eliminate free-riding.151  The Court of Appeals for the 11th District has yet to 
release a decision.152 
4. Analysis 
Moore should be able to avoid trademark infringement by applying the functionality doctrine.153  Artists such as 
Moore can harness the doctrine to avoid the shakedown for royalties that they face from sports franchises.154  
The merchandising right lacks trademark policy grounds because it is not about source designation and owes its 
existence to a fear of free-riding taken too far.155  Fear of free-riding is not a good policy ground for expanding 
trademark law given that non-confusion copycat products enhance competition and keep prices low for 
consumers.156  The functionality doctrine can shrink the merchandising right and mitigate the right’s 
monopolistic tendencies.157  Moreover, utilizing the doctrine in this capacity would also enhance predictability 
and promote efficiency in the courts.158  Policy aside, according to the various functionality tests, the use of 
sports team colours are functional uses.159   
4.1  Testing the Functionality of Artistic Depictions of Sporting Events 
The functionality doctrine prevents mark-holders from tying up a useful product feature.160  Modern courts use a 
variety of tests to assess functionality.161  Sports teams’ colours satisfy functionality criteria regardless of which 
test we apply.162  Under the identification test, “a feature can be trademarked only if it serves to identify the  
                                                          
147
 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 127 at 23-24. 
148
 Brief for et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 18, Alabama v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 
F.Supp.2d 1238 (2009) (Nos. 09-16412-AA, 10-10092-A). 
149
 Id. at 19. 
150
 See id. at 20. 
151
 See Brief for et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Alabama v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 
1238 (2009) (Nos. 09-16412-AA, 10-10092-A) (commenting on behalf of New Life, Inc.).  Trademark law generally 
encourages free-riding, however, because it enhances marketplace competition.  See Board of Governors of the University of 
North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F.Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (“One can capitalize on a market or fad created by another 
provided it is not accomplished by confusing the public into mistakenly purchasing the product in the belief that the product 
is the product of the competitor.”) 
152
 See Daily Log, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, archived at  
http://www.webcitation.org/5wTZCjpxO (listing published cases in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit). 
153
 See infra pp. 19-21 (applying tests for functionality to Moore’s case). 
154
 See Brief for et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 24, Alabama v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 
F.Supp.2d 1238 (2009) (Nos. 09-16412-AA, 10-10092-A) (“the University’s functionality argument . . . boils down to a 
simple contention that New Life’s ability to use the colors of Alabama’s football uniforms allows New Life to gain a benefit 
for which the University would charge a licensing fee if it could”). 
155
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 147-48 (2010) (criticizing the merchandising right). 
156
 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1073 (stating that extension of 
government sponsored monopoly should occur only if necessary). 
157
 See infra pp. 22-23 (examining the impact on the merchandising right of applying the functionality doctrine). 
158
 See infra pp. 24-25 (examining the impact on the merchandising right of applying the functionality doctrine). 
159
 See infra pp. 23-26 (applying tests for functionality to Moore’s case). 
160
 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (defining functionality doctrine). 
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manufacturer or sponsor of the product.”163  The effective competition test provides an alternative formulation of 
the test for functionality and is the prevailing theory in modern courts.164   
 
Using the identification test, Moore’s use of Alabama’s colours does not indicate to purchasers of the 
artwork that it was created or sponsored by the University.165  Consumers experience minimal confusion in 
situations where they purchase such art and the confusion is not to the source of the goods.166  As Moore’s brief 
stated, “Capitalizing on a market, a fad or even the goodwill created by others, however, is simply not prohibited 
in the absence of any confusion.”167  While purchasers clearly identify the colours in the artwork with the 
Alabama football program, no evidence exists that they assume that the paintings were produced or sponsored by 
the Alabama corporate entity.168  The absence of sponsorship confusion renders the trademark use functional 
under the identification test.169   
 
The effective competition test used by the Traffix Court determines “if conferring trademark protection for 
that feature would enable the trademark holder to prevent other suppliers from competing over the market for the 
product.”170  If the law hinders Moore’s access to colours of crimson and red, it would run afoul of the effective 
competition test.171  The fact that the paintings include easily identifiable Alabama football players is the sine 
qua non of the work.172  If a potential customer faced the option of purchasing two skilful depictions of a great 
moment in Alabama football, one bearing the trademarked Alabama crimson and white and another with 
random, unidentifiable colours, it would be no choice at all; the customer would choose the piece with the 
Alabama colours in it.173  In this sense, the Alabama team colours perform a function without which Moore 
could not effectively compete.174   
 
Some courts, such as the court in National Football League Properties are quick to find sponsorship 
confusion for sports merchandise.175  The sponsorship confusion argument holds more water where we are 
dealing with clothing, hats, or official jerseys because there has been evidence presented in cases involving such 
goods that sponsorship confusion occurs.176  However, there is no indicia of consumer sponsorship of artistic  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
161
 See Wong, supra note 20, at 1132 (“courts have formulated an arcane assortment of tests and sub-definitions, seemingly 
without any consistent methodology”). 
162
 See Wong, supra note 20, at 1132. 
163
 Wong, supra note 20,  at 1133 (defining identification theory as the original understanding of functionality).   
164
 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wong, supra note 20, at 1142 (noting that the 
competition test has been adopted in a majority of courts and in the Restatement Third of Unfair Competition).   
165
 See Amici Brief at 13 (“in light of Moore’s own artistic reputation and his prominent use of his name on each painting, 
there is simply no reason to think that consumers care what sort of contractual relationship, if any, New Life has with the 
University, or that they would even think about such a relationship when making decisions”). 
166
 See id. 
167
 Brief of Appellee, supra note 127 at 23. 
168
 See Amici Brief at 10-11 (noting lack of evidence).   
169
 See Amici Brief at 13.  
170
 Wong, supra note 20, at 1143 (describing effective competition test as the presently prevailing test in courts). 
171
 See Amici Brief at 23 (“It is the defendant’s non-source-related need . . . that triggers the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine”). 
172
 See Amici Brief at 20 (“Other colors simply are no substitute for accurately depicting Alabama’s Crimson and White”).  
Conveying support for the university’s football team is the artwork’s raison d’être.  See id. 
173
 See Amici Brief at 20 (“Fans of Alabama football want pictures of Alabama football players, and it is cold comfort to say 
that New Life can sell pictures of non-Alabama football players”). 
174
 See Amici Brief at 15 (“audiences are interested in Moore’s work precisely because they are realistic depictions of actual 
events”). 
175
 See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ill. App. 
1975) (describing evidentiary survey completed by a professor of law and sociology). “78% of the respondents identified the 
emblems with football teams; of this 78%, 69% believed all or some of the emblems were official, 58% believed the 
emblems were authorized by the teams and 60% believed clothing to which the emblems were affixed was authorized.”  Id. 
176
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 477 (“later rulings in NFL suits have turned upon 
surveys and other evidence indicating the widespread belief that team-related jerseys are officially licensed by the NFL”). 
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works such as Daniel Moore’s paintings; therefore, under the identification test there should be no cause of 
action available for the sports franchises.177 
 
Even though the painting’s colours don’t perform a mechanical function, the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
allows for an examination of the aesthetic feature’s functional characteristics.178  Moore will suffer a significant 
non-reputation related disadvantage if he is not allowed to use the colours of crimson and red because no 
customer will want paintings that depict moments in Alabama football history that do not actually include 
Alabama players and colours.179  The functional nature of Moore’s uses removes any trademark protections to 
the colours, so he should be able to use the sports team colours to convey his artistic message.180   
4.2 Merchandising Right / Lack of Harm 
Courts often retreat to principles outside of trademark law to justify the merchandising right, which owes its 
existence largely to fears of unjust enrichment and free riding.181  Free-riding, however, is generally encouraged 
in United States because it creates competition, driving down prices and improving the quality of goods.182  Even 
courts motivated by such a fear acknowledge the grossly disparate positions of artists, even successful artists 
such as Moore, and large mark-holding companies such as Major League Baseball, the National Football League 
or Alabama University.183  In extending a right unjustified by traditional principles of trademark law, the courts 
merely reverse the flow of the unwarranted enrichment – into the hands of the large mark-holding interests.184  
Meanwhile, this re-routing causes Americans to miss out on the benefits of harmless free-riding in the realm of 
the merchandising right by having less choice in the marketplace.185  Artists must pay a licensing fee to complete 
their artwork and earn a living; this cost will be passed on to consumers.186  The merchandising right has been 
criticized at length.187  Allowing artists to use team colours reduces the scope of the right.188   
 
Monopolies create adverse consequences for the populace.189  The merchandising right creates exactly the 
sort of monopoly that the functionality doctrine seeks to temper.190  Despite the fact that customers want to 
display support for the franchise by wearing team colours, the sports industry sustains their infinite-duration 
monopoly on these colours through trademark law concepts.191  Such an infinite monopoly in a functional feature  
                                                          
177
 See Amici Brief at 10-11 (placing burden of proving sponsorship confusion on the University of Alabama). 
178
  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (finding the gold color of laundry press pads functional). 
179
 See Amicus Brief at 19 (“most consumers purchase New Life’s products because they contain realistic depictions of the 
Alabama football uniforms”). 
180
 See Amici Brief at 25 (proposing that restricting such speech is harmful to society). 
181
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 482 (“The merchandising right cases seem to stem from 
the unjust enrichment instinct”). “The Supreme Court views functionality as the ultimate guardian of marketplace 
competition, and has, of late, repeatedly emphasized its significance.”  Id. at 471. 
182
 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1050 (exposing the benefits 
of free-riding). 
183
 See Brief of Appellee at 15, University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238 
(N.D.Ala.,2009) (2008 WL 3115445) (describing the parties in the litigation).   
184
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 137 (“Courts have understood in these cases, as in the merchandising cases, that 
substantial value was at stake, and their sense that the value belonged to the mark owner clearly influenced their decision”). 
185
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 137 (“The market preemption and free-riding arguments have served to distract 
attention from the question of whether consumers are in fact confused to their detriment--or, in the case of dilution, whether 
they are otherwise harmed--by such uses”). 
186
 See Brief of Appellee at 15, University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F.Supp.2d 1238 
(N.D.Ala.,2009) (2008 WL 3115445).   
187
 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 506 (“the Supreme Court seems to have a firm 
idea of what trademark law is about, a vision that leaves no room for a merchandising right”). 
188
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).   
189
 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 44-47 (1872) (warning of the dangers of monopolies). 
190
 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §7:49 (4th ed. 2010). 
191
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 471-72 (noting tendency of universities to garner 
royalties). 
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violates the limited times provision of the Copyright clause insofar as the trademark has copyright protection.192  
Where only the official licensing agency of the respective mark holders may manufacture goods bearing the 
team marks, we do not strike the proper policy balance in light of consumers and new-comers to the market.193  
Functionality’s monopoly-busting tendencies can be harnessed.194 
 
Some defenders of the merchandising right assert natural rights as a justification for its existence.195  Evoking 
John Locke, the proponents of this argument note the priceless value of trademarks and feel that the mark-holder 
stands in the most worthy position to receive the benefit of that value.196  Alabama’s brief contains hints of the 
argument: that because Alabama holds a mark in the crimson and white colours, they deserve to receive any 
value extracted from that mark.197  However, these justifications do not accommodate or justify Alabama’s 
argument that they deserve any and all value derived from their marks.198 
 
The unjust enrichment approach inherent in the merchandising right inhibits competition and creates 
monopolies.199  The public shoulders the harm by having to pay more for all products bearing the mark, 
including artwork.200  If we temper the merchandising right, a door will open allowing competitors and 
competition to enter the market which will drive down costs and make art more readily available and 
accessible.201  Additionally, a larger percentage of the profits from such pieces of art would make their way into 
artists’ pockets.202 
4.3. Moore’s Alternative Defenses 
The argument of trademark functionality in Moore’s paintings intersects to a substantial degree with a fair use 
defence or an appeal to the First Amendment.203  Moore asserts a classic fair use defence in addition to claiming 
aesthetic functionality.204  The essence of Moore’s fair use argument is that he used Alabama’s mark in good 
faith and in a descriptive way (not as a designator of source).205  Under the test for good faith described in  
                                                          
192
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
193
 See Derek Taylor, Splitting the Uprights: How the Seventh Circuit’s American Needle Holding Created a Circuit Split and 
Exempted the NFL from Antitrust Scrutiny, and Why the Supreme Court Should Overturn the Seventh Circuit, 6 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 148 (2010) (describing prevalence of the exclusive licensing agent model); Owning 
Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 188.  The Supreme Court agrees with the importance of preserving competition: “The Supreme 
Court's opinions manifest a deep-seated concern for the inherent value of competition in product markets.” Dogan & Lemley, 
The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 496. 
194
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 471-72 (noting tendency of universities to garner 
royalties). 
195
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 181 (analyzing natural rights justification for extending the merchandising right).   
196
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 181-82. 
197
 See Univ. Compl., supra note 122 at 6 (“Daniel Moore is a commercial artist who has made substantial sums from, and 
developed a reputation based largely on, relationships with the University of Alabama”). 
198
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 182.   
199
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 184-85.  “An unjust enrichment approach--one that attempts to identify and weed 
out free riding--may actually do affirmative economic harm.” Id. 
200
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 186 (““And there is substantial social benefit, not only to the seller but to 
consumers, who get a wider variety of mark-related goods, generally at a lower price and of higher quality than the mark 
owner alone would license”). 
201
 See Daniel Moore, The Coach and 315, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5wTb7vzcK (listing 175 dollars as the 
asking price). Seems expensive enough as it is.  Id. 
202
 See Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 94, at 170 (hinting that fear of free riding creates windfall for trademark holder).   
203
 See Moore’s brief at 15.   
Whether the doctrinal tool is functionality . . . aesthetic functionality . . . nominative fair-use . . . or a First 
Amendment-based defense . . . the point is the same: Trademark law recognizes that claims of source confusion 
must be rejected when they interfere with substantial policies ensuring freedom to speak or to compete.  
Id. 
204
 See id. 
205
 See International Stamp Art, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2006) (providing the test for the 
classic fair use defense). 
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International Stamp Art, Moore used is the mark in good faith because he did not intend to create confusion as to 
source.206  At this point, the fair use discussion merges with the functionality considerations discussed in 
previous sections; i.e., just as source-confusion was determinative in answering the functionality and 
merchandising right questions discussed above, the strength of Moore’s fair use defence hinges in large part on 
the extent of consumer confusion as to the source of the goods.207  Consumers are not confused about the source 
of Moore’s paintings despite the presence of Alabama’s trademarks; therefore Moore’s fair use defence would 
likely succeed.208 
 
The fair use defence inherently considers First Amendment concerns.209  Moore has a right under the First 
Amendment to express his artistic message.210  Moore’s brief highlights the high degree First Amendment 
protection afforded to his fine art.211  In balancing mark-holders’ interests against individuals’ First Amendment 
rights, we consider the public interest in free expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer 
confusion.212  All roads lead to Rome; i.e., in analyzing a First Amendment defence we again consider the 
likelihood of consumer confusion.213  Moore’s use does not create confusion as to the source of the good and so 
the balance tilts in favour of the public interest in preserving the freedom of expression.214    
 
The defences of fair use and the First Amendment protection hinge on the same principle that determined the 
applicability of the merchandising right in the face of functionality - no confusion as to source.215  Still, a 
functionality defence provides benefits to artists that transcend the protection afforded by fair use.216  For one, 
the determination of functionality occurs at the beginning of the pleading instead of at the end.  Functionality 
avoids the uncertainty that is evident in the fair use doctrine in the wake of the KP Permanent decision, where 
confusion remains a determinative factor in applying the fair use defence.217  If a trademark is found functional, 
evidence of confusion simply does not matter.218  Additionally, a functionality defence carries more rhetorical 
force than a fair use defence.219    
4.4   Limitations 
This application of the functionality doctrine applies only to sports teams’ trademarks used in artists’ original 
paintings, prints, sculptures and other graphic renditions.220   It would not apply to t-shirts, hats, jerseys, or other  
 
                                                          
206
 See id. at 1274 (defining good faith in the context of descriptive fair use). 
207
 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005) (listing ‘the degree of likely 
confusion’ as a factor for the jury to consider in determining fair use). 
208
 See Amici Brief at 10-11 (placing burden of proving sponsorship confusion on the University of Alabama). 
209
 See Michael B. Weitman, Fair Use in Trademark in the Post-KP Permanent World, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1665, 1693 
(“trademark fair use certainly intertwines freedom of speech concerns”). 
210
 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994, 996 (holding that the movie title “Ginger and Fred” did not infringe on Ginger 
Rodger’s right of publicity). 
211
 See Moore’s brief at 8.  The fact that Moore sells his visual images in commerce does not substantially diminish the 
amount of protection afforded to his speech.  Id. 
212
 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994, 998 (“the [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where 
the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression”). 
213
 See id.  
214
 See Amici Brief at 10-11. 
215
 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (including confusion as a factor in the fair 
use analysis); University of Kansas v. Sinks, 565 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1225-26 (including consideration of sponsorship confusion 
in applying merchandising right). 
216
 See e.g. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (allowing petition for cancellation of a mark that is functional). 
217
 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004) 
218
 See Dogloo, Inc. v. Doskocil Mfg. Co., 893 F. Supp. 911, 918 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("Functionality is a potent public policy, 
for it trumps all evidence of [confusion]." 
219
 Saying “You don’t have a trademark” hits harder than saying “You have a trademark but I am permitted to use it.” 
220
 See University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., 677 F. Supp.  2d 1238, 1250 (N.D.Ala., 2009) 
(recognizing distinction between fine art and “cards, T-shirts, cups, mugs, posters, mini prints, calendars”). 
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articles of clothing because of the increased likelihood of sponsorship confusion in those markets.221  Mark-
holding sports teams would still possess revenue streams in other areas, including all situations where adequate 
evidence of sponsorship confusion exists.222  
5. Conclusion 
Courts should apply the functionality doctrine to sports’ team colours in graphic, artistic works.  Under modern 
functionality tests, sports team colours used in artwork meet functionality requirements.  The functionality 
doctrine exists to prevent monopolies over useful product features.  The application tempers the expansive 
merchandising right – a right based not in traditional trademark logic but in instinctive, unwarranted fear against 
free riding on disparate or unrelated goods.  Functionality provides artists a stronger, more rhetorically forceful 
argument than typical affirmative defences. 
 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
 
                                                          
221
 See id. 
222
 See Dogan & Lemley, The Merchandising Right, supra note 60 at 506 (concluding that most consumer confusion cases 
can be decided on the basis of sponsorship or post-sale confusion). 
